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ABSTRACT 
The long-standing discussion on decoupling has recently moved from adopters not 
implementing the agreed-upon policies towards compliant adopters not achieving the goals 
intended by institutional entrepreneurs. This ‘means-ends decoupling’ prevails especially in 
highly opaque fields, where practices, causality, and performance are hard to understand and 
chart. This paper conceptualizes the conditions under which the adoption of institutions in 
relatively opaque fields leads to the achievement of the envisaged goals. Voluntary 
sustainability standards governing socio-environmental issues illustrate these arguments. I 
argue that the lack of field transparency drives institutional entrepreneurs to create and 
maintain concrete and uniform rules, apply strong incentives, and disseminate ‘best practices’ 
to ensure substantive adopter compliance. However, such rigid institutions are ill-equipped to 
deal with the causal complexity and practice multiplicity underlying opacity while they 
smother adopter agency. The ensuing tension between substantive compliance and goal 
achievement leads to an inherent trade-off: institutional entrepreneurs who remedy the policy-
practice decoupling may enhance the disparity between means and ends, and vice versa. 
While sustainability standards and other institutions in highly opaque fields can, therefore, not 
fully achieve the envisaged goals, the trade-off can be reduced through systemically designed 
institutions that promote goal internalization and contain niche institutions. 
 
Key words: adoption, complexity, compliance, decoupling, goal achievement, institution, 
opacity, self-regulation, socio-environmental governance, sustainability standard, voluntary 
standard 
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INTRODUCTION 
After studying the decoupling of policies and practices for decades, institutional scholars have 
recently addressed inconsistencies between practices and outcomes. The seminal contribution 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977) on the prevalence of externally induced rule adoption that does 
not match the internal needs of organizations, often leading to isomorphic structures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), has inspired numerous scholars to study the conditions and 
extent of deviations between actual practices and official policies in different types of 
organizations (for overviews, see Bromley & Powell, 2012; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). 
While a close understanding of the mismatch between policies and practices is important from 
both an organizational and a societal perspective, the overwhelming scholarly attention to this 
type of decoupling has obscured our understanding of another, potentially even more 
important kind of decoupling, the one between practices and outcomes. As Bromley and 
Powell (2012) powerfully argue, organizations that actually comply with their formal policies 
may not, or barely, achieve the very objectives that developers and implementers of these 
policies envisage. While coupling policies and practices, compliant organizations may not 
achieve the intended results because the adopted policies are inappropriate. This ‘means-ends 
decoupling’ prevails especially in highly opaque – as opposed to transparent – fields. Opacity 
exists when observers have difficulty identifying the characteristics of prevailing practices, 
establishing causal relationships between policies and outcomes, and measuring the exact 
results of policy implementation (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Jiang & Bansal, 2003; Bromley 
& Powell, 2012).   
One burgeoning field in which means may be decoupled from ends is socio-
environmental governance. Different societal actors (companies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and/or governments) in this field design and implement regulation to 
obtain favorable socio-environmental outcomes (Delmas & Young, 2009; Espinosa & 
4 
 
Walker, 2011). These actors function as institutional entrepreneurs: resourceful individuals or 
groups who purposefully create new or change existing institutions (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; 
Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). Institutional entrepreneurs are interested actors who 
use their social and political skills to make others accept novel or different institutional 
practices, using tactics such as framing issues, creating incentives, and building bridges 
(Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Fligstein, 1997; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). 
Voluntary standards are governance mechanisms that have recently taken off to achieve a 
positive impact of corporate actions on social actors and/or the natural environment (Auld, 
Balboa, Bernstein, & Cashore, 2009). These standards are often developed and maintained by 
private actors (i.e., firms and NGOs) and have been massively adopted by firms in a variety of 
sectors (Vogel, 2008; Tamm Hallström & Boström, 2010), ranging from ecolabeled lumber 
(Bartley, 2007; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009), wine (Delmas & Grant, forthcoming), and sea 
fish (Visseren-Hamakers, Arts, & Glasbergen, 2007; Oosterveer & Spaargaren, 2011) to fair-
trade coffee (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012), flowers (Riisgaard, 2009; Prado, 
2013), and clothing (O’Rourke, 2007). Sustainability standards are voluntary, predefined rules 
and methods to systematically assess and communicate the social and environmental behavior 
and/or performance of firms (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011). In particular, they flag to 
customers and other stakeholders that producers or traders who adopt sustainability standards 
show a higher socio-environmental performance than their uncertified counterparts (King & 
Toffel, 2009). The field of socio-environmental governance is highly opaque, because the 
relation between corporate activities and socio-environmental outcomes is hard to fully 
understand, causally attribute, and precisely measure (Jiang & Bansal, 2003; Sharma, 2000). 
This opacity may explain why scholarly evidence on the socio-environmental outcomes of 
sustainability standards has remained inconclusive: some scholars have reported a positive 
impact (e.g., Potoski & Prakash, 2005; Dasgupta, Hettige, & Wheeler, 2000), whereas others 
5 
 
have found only a modest (Gulbrandsen, 2010) or even no or a negative correlation (e.g., 
Christmann & Taylor, 2012; King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005). Sustainability standards are 
salient to theorize on institutions whose means may be decoupled from their ends, because 
they are societally important, embedded in highly opaque fields, formally prescribe adopter 
behavior, and specify intended goals. Therefore, I will use these standards to illustrate the 
conceptual arguments on institutional goal achievement in more opaque fields. 
The paper’s central research question is: under what conditions does the adoption of 
institutions in relatively opaque fields lead to the achievement of the goals set by their 
developers? I will explore this question in the context of voluntary sustainability standards 
and draw on the institutional literature. This strand offers a sharp analytical lens to explain the 
opportunities and constraints that durable collective agreements offer to field actors, 
consisting of a diversity of individuals and organizations that interact relatively frequently 
with one another in specific issue areas (Scott, 2001; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). 
Sustainability standards are institutions: they constitute rules of the game serving to define 
social practices, assign roles, and guide interactions (Young, 1994). These standards are 
relatively lasting arrangements that enable and restrict a variety of corporate and civic actors 
at different stages of the supply chain (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010), thereby lending 
themselves to the use of an institutional perspective. Previous institutional work on 
sustainability standard adoption has shed light on issues of symbolic adoption (Delmas & 
Montes-Sancho, 2010; Christmann & Taylor, 2006) and standard enforcement (King, Prado, 
& Rivera, 2012; Aravind & Christmann, 2011). I will draw on these insights but also develop 
novel arguments around an important dimension of standard adoption that has received only 
scant attention in the extant literature.  
Building on and extending the insights by Bromley and Powell (2012), I will argue that 
high field opacity renders the optimal design and implementation of institutions such as 
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sustainability standards impossible. On the one hand, the risk of non-compliance (i.e., purely 
symbolic adoption) is high in relatively opaque fields due to the causal complexity of focal 
issues, the diversity of adopted practices, and the difficulty to observe opportunistic adopters. 
This enhances the need for concrete and uniform rules, strong incentives, and transfer of ‘best 
practices’ to ensure substantive compliance by adopters. On the other hand, complexity and 
diversity call for holistic and context-contingent approaches, which are at odds with the nature 
of compliance-oriented institutions. While the antipodal nature of the breeding grounds of 
compliance and achievement leads to the impossibility to design and uphold optimal 
institutions in highly opaque fields, the trade-off can be reduced by designing key rules with a 
systemic mindset, stimulating adopters to internalize an institution’s goals, and developing 
‘niche institutions’ to accommodate context specificity. 
The paper contributes to the institutional literature by identifying and explaining the 
tension that exists in relatively opaque fields between compliance with an institution’s rules 
(‘the letter’) and achievement of the goals for which those rules were defined (‘the spirit’) as 
well as offering remedies to mitigate this tension. The conceptual insight that solving the 
problem of symbolic adoption can aggravate the problem of not achieving the intended goals 
(i.e., means oppose ends) is novel to the institutional literature. The paper also contributes to 
the literature on social and environmental governance by conceptualizing the conditions under 
which voluntary sustainability standards induce corporate adopters with divergent motivations 
and resources to (partially) achieve the socio-environmental goals of a standard. Thirdly, the 
paper has practical relevance for designers and adopters of sustainability standards and other 
institutions in highly opaque fields by teasing out the conditions under which their standards 
are more conducive to achieving the very goals they are meant to serve. The paper now 
continues by describing the evolution, rationales, types, and process of creating and adopting 
sustainability standards. Next, I recap the discussion in the institutional literature about 
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symbolic versus substantive adoption, including remedies to symbolic adoption. I then 
introduce the compliance-achievement trade-off, arguing when and why substantive adoption 
does not equate with goal achievement and suggesting how the tension between both can be 
reduced. Finally, I discuss the implications of this trade-off for future conceptual and 
empirical work on sustainability standards and other institutions in relatively opaque fields. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS CHARACTERIZED  
Within three decades, voluntary sustainability standards have developed from inexistent to 
hundreds of standards in a wide variety of sectors, increasingly attaining both high absolute 
volumes and significant market shares. For example, the Marine Stewardship Council label 
for marine fish has a worldwide market share of seven per cent (Oosterveer & Spaargaren, 
2011), and certified products even dominate in certain national markets – with shares of 
around 50 per cent for sustainably logged wood and fair-trade bananas in the United Kingdom 
(McNicol, 2006; Archer & Fritsch, 2010). Certain standards are firm-specific, while others 
are eligible for all companies in one sector or even stretch out across industries (Gilbert et al., 
2011). Furthermore, they can be developed by one type of (corporate or civic) actors (Zietsma 
& McKnight, 2009) or multiple (private and/or public) stakeholders (Tamm Hallström & 
Boström, 2010). They can refer to process improvements, such as ISO 14000 (Prakash & 
Potoski, 2006) and ISO 26000 (Helms, Oliver, & Webb, 2012), or specify absolute 
performance requirements, like the Forest Stewardship Council (McNicol, 2006) and the 
Marine Stewardship Council (Oosterveer & Spaargaren, 2011).  
An essential function of voluntary sustainability standards is their signaling that the 
socio-environmental outcomes related to certified products or processes – and which are 
typically not observable to prospective customers and other stakeholders – are more positive 
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than those of their uncertified counterparts (King & Toffel, 2009).
2
 This signaling function is 
critical, because the production of goods or services creates socio-environmental effects that 
are not embodied in the products, thereby precluding external stakeholders from properly 
assessing products and firms (Terlaak, 2007). For example, it is unclear whether the 
production and trade of fruits and vegetables in supermarkets involved environmental 
pollution and labor exploitation or occurred under ‘responsible’ conditions. Sustainability 
standards signal that the products or firms carrying labels have a relatively positive socio-
environmental performance.
3
 The voluntary nature of participation creates a distinction 
between adopters and non-adopters. The former are in a different category, whose collective 
identity of ‘responsibility’ confers legitimacy or other benefits (Navis & Glynn, 2010). 
Sustainability standards are most likely to proliferate in (developing) countries and 
(transnational) sectors where other governance forms – in particular, collective action, 
legislation, and donation – have fallen short. Social movements, which have improved the 
wages and working conditions of many workers in developed countries (Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008), may be unable to form a countervailing power against influential, 
footloose (foreign) investors (Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006), especially in developing 
countries (Graham & Woods, 2007). Alternatively, government intervention has led to social 
emancipation (e.g., through legislation around minimum wages and affirmative action) and to 
                                                          
2
 Signaling a positive impact does not necessarily imply that the actual socio-environmental performance of 
sustainability standards is higher. Scholars have argued that these standards may legitimize unethical business 
practices (Howard, Nash, & Ehrenfeld, 2000), lead to adverse selection of poor performers (Delmas & Montes-
Sancho, 2010; Terlaak, 2007), and be dominated by powerful actors (Glasbergen, 2012; Bitzer, Francken, & 
Glasbergen, 2008). 
3
 Codes of conduct resemble sustainability standards, since both seek to specify and implement socially and 
environmentally benign business practices. Codes, however, do not involve labels communicating such practices 
(Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006).  
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environmental protection (with instruments such as environmental permits and levies on 
industrial waste releases) in many industrialized countries (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), but 
may lead to poor legislation and policies in (developing) countries struck by widespread 
corruption, lack of enforcement capacity, and low policy priority to socio-environmental 
protection (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007; López, 2007). Finally, while negative 
socio-environmental outcomes may be addressed through the institution of philanthropy (List, 
2011), with citizens, companies, and governments donating money or contributing in kind to 
offset low incomes or halt negative health effects (Visser, 2008; Berger, Cunningham, & 
Drumwright, 2004), prospective donors may abstain from charity when opining that donations 
only abate symptoms and not their root causes (Easterly, 2006). In the absence of well-
functioning alternative institutional arrangements, a governance void exists that renders the 
development of sustainability standards particularly relevant. It should be stressed, though, 
that these standards are not mere substitutes of other institutions; in fact, their performance is 
higher when complemented by alternative arrangements, such as legislation (Lee, 2009; 
Gulbrandsen, 2010; Vogel, 2008; Amengual, 2010; Kim, 2013). 
The very presence of governance voids does not imply that sustainability standards will 
emerge and flourish. Since these standards are voluntary, prospective developers or adopters 
only embrace standards when perceiving them as sufficiently salient (Ocasio, 1997) to be 
developed or adopted. Three types of motivation induce NGOs and firms to embrace 
sustainability standards: instrumental, relational, and moral drivers (cf. Aguilera, Rupp, 
Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2000). Instrumentally motivated actors seek to 
advance their material self-interests. Firms may consider sustainability standards a means to 
enhance their competitiveness through differentiation (with more ‘equitable’ and ‘clean’ 
products) and to raise their profitability through a price premium (Henson, Masakure, & 
Cranfield, 2011; Bartley, 2007; King et al., 2012). NGOs may require corporate donations in 
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return for their endorsement and advice (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Berger et al., 2004). 
Relationally driven actors aim to obtain legitimacy or recognition. Firms scrutizined by social 
and environmental ‘watchdogs’ (Campbell, 2007; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004) may create 
or adopt sustainability standards to show they are ‘responsible’ corporate citizens (cf. 
Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012; Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007). NGOs, also increasingly 
under societal scrutiny (Burger & Owens, 2010; Lyon, 2010), may try to enhance their 
legitimacy by (co)developing sustainability standards. Finally, morally induced actors seek to 
create or join ‘ethically correct’ institutions (Reinecke et al., 2012; Bansal & Roth, 2000). The 
personal influence of top managers or the wider corporate identity may drive firms to pursue 
‘higher-order’ values (Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal, 2003). Normative convictions typically 
motivate NGOs to change societal norms and values (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Lyon, 2010).   
NGOs and firms sufficiently motivated to (jointly) develop sustainability standards 
establish rules, incentives, and support structures to stimulate that adopters achieve the 
defined goals.
4
 Standard developers focus on the most salient socio-environmental issues, 
because the voluntary nature of these institutions gives them the discretion to do so, the 
number of potentially relevant issues is large, their resources are constrained, and an objective 
basis for assessing criteria lacks (cf. Ocasio, 1997). NGOs and firms may have shared 
interests but are also likely to privilege different aspects (Helms et al., 2012; Bartley, 2007). 
They manage to get their preferred substance and form accepted in accordance with their 
bargaining power (Glasbergen, 2012; Tamm Hallström & Boström, 2010; Reinecke et al., 
2012). Once developed, sustainability standards need to be widely adopted by incumbent 
                                                          
4
 Multi-stakeholder standards involving NGOs and firms are very common for the reasons outlined above. 
Sustainability standards may also be single-stakeholder (i.e., developed by only corporate or civic actors), or 
consist of partnerships by firms, governments, and NGOs (Gilbert et al., 2011; Tamm Hallström & Boström, 
2010). In all cases, the same arguments hold to the extent that these standards are voluntary in nature. 
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firms to leverage their impact. Since adoption is a voluntary decision that involves 
certification and adaptation costs, incumbents will only proceed to adoption when they expect 
the associated benefits to outweigh these costs (Schuler & Christmann, 2011). While adopters 
commit themselves to adhering to the goals and rules of the selected standards, firms may be 
tempted to reap the benefits without bearing the costs of adoption (King et al., 2012; Graffin 
& Ward, 2010). When firms adopt sustainability standards only symbolically, institutional 
entrepreneurs do not achieve their envisaged goals. Therefore, sustainability standards need to 
be designed and implemented in such a way that adopters will substantively comply with 
standard requirements (Campbell, 2007; King et al., 2012; Baron & Lyon, 2012), a topic to 
which I now turn.  
 
COUPLING ADOPTION AND COMPLIANCE 
Compliance Barriers 
Actors operating in highly opaque (i.e., non-transparent) fields face difficulties to fully 
understand the nature of field practices, to causally relate actor behavior and field outcomes, 
and to correctly measure the exact field impact of actor behavior (Jiang & Bansal, 2003; 
Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). Ipso facto, it is hard to chart whether adopters of institutions such 
as sustainability standards substantively comply in relatively opaque fields. I now argue that 
the presence of complex causal patterns and the concurrence of heterogeneous practices 
underlie the difficulty to causally relate behavior and outcomes, while the invisibility of actor 
behavior entails measurement challenges. Opacity thus leads to uncertainty and ambiguity 
among field actors. An important consequence is that three major compliance barriers exist in 
more opaque fields: the lack of attention, the lack of motivation, and the lack of knowledge.
5
   
                                                          
5
 These barriers are directly related to field opacity, although adopters may also face other barriers, such as the 
lack of material resources. 
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Causal complexity. The presence of a multitude of heterogeneous actors and factors that are 
interconnected in multiple, non-linear ways leads to complexity (Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012; 
Espinosa & Walker, 2011). Different types of uncertainty are the result of this complexity. 
Cognitively bounded actors encounter difficulties to adequately understand complex fields, 
leading not only to state uncertainty or ignorance about the exact nature of a field but also to 
effect uncertainty or ignorance about cause-effect relations (Milliken, 1987). The existence of 
numerous, heterogeneous, direct and indirect effects leads to “causal indeterminacy” (Orton & 
Weick, 1990), which undermines the ability of field actors to be cognizant of all relevant 
causes and to disentangle causes and consequences (Lindblom, 1959; Davis, Eisenhardt, & 
Bingham, 2009). Causal complexity is further enhanced when outcomes feed back into their 
causes, thus blurring the distinction between causes and consequences (Sterman, 2000; Levy 
& Lichtenstein, 2012). Relatedly, adopters may face response uncertainty: the inability to 
assess the impact of their behavior (Milliken, 1987). These types of uncertainty may induce 
adopters to be unaware of, and thus not to pay due attention to, critical drivers of compliant 
behavior (Ocasio, 1997). Adopters who learn experientially by discovering through trial-and-
error experimentation and organizational search (Levit & March, 1988; Baum, Li, & Usher, 
2000) may not comply because the large number of relevant factors and interactions renders 
the discovery of feasible solutions highly challenging. The uncertainty that stems from causal 
complexity thus leads to a lack of attention and knowledge, which thwarts the ability of 
cognitively bounded adopters to comply through experiential learning. 
Practice multiplicity. The difficulty to engage in compliant behavior is further compounded 
when adopters observe practice diversity among other adopters. Institutional fields may host a 
multitude of divergent practices, especially when actors are spread across different geographic 
regions, cultural contexts, socio-political systems, and economic situations. Cognitively 
bounded actors experience difficulties to make sense of practice multiplicity or the 
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concurrence of many heterogeneous routines (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Young, 2012). The 
higher the number of divergent practices encountered in a field, the more difficult it is for 
adopters to exhaustively understand and compare the merits and limitations of different 
practices. Ambiguity may be the result, especially when different practices are incompatible 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010), making adopters wonder which of the many 
coexisting practices lead(s) to compliant behavior. Adopters who learn vicariously by 
observing and (selectively) imitating other actors (Terlaak & Gong, 2008; Baum et al., 2000) 
may thus fail to comply because they choose to copy the ‘wrong’ practices. The ambiguity 
resulting from the concurrence of multiple heterogeneous practices thus entails a lack of 
attention and knowledge, leading vicariously learning adopters not to comply because they 
ignore relevant solutions and imitate counterproductive practices.
6
 
Behavioral invisibility. The inability to readily observe and assess the behavior of actors is 
another driver of opacity (Jiang & Bansal, 2003). Behavioral invisibility is more common 
when actors operate in remote places (O’Rourke, 2007), are relatively low-profile (Spar & La 
Mure, 2003), or are otherwise shielded from external control (Howard et al., 2000). For 
example, the socio-environmental consequences of corporate behavior are typically not 
embodied in physical product characteristics, hence rendering them invisible for external 
stakeholders (King & Toffel, 2009). Consequently, actors may ‘fly under the radar’ and 
merely pretend to substantively comply. When adopters have a self-interest not to comply 
(e.g., to avoid costly adaptations to their production methods), behavioral invisibility enables 
them to disguise their non-compliance and to avoid sanctions such as loss of legitimacy 
(Aravind & Christmann, 2011). Behavioral invisibility thus undermines compliance to the 
extent that instrumentally and relationally driven adopters lack the motivation to comply. To 
                                                          
6
 Causal complexity and practice multiplicity share the outcome that adopters lack the attention and knowledge 
to comply, albeit the former is mainly driven by uncertainty and the latter more by ambiguity. 
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recap, institutional entrepreneurs who want to ensure adopter compliance need to overcome 
the attention, knowledge, and motivation barriers that prevail in relatively opaque fields.  
 
Compliance Inducements 
While institutional entrepreneurs may need to induce adopters to comply in any type of 
institutional field, the necessity to do so is high in relatively opaque fields given the 
significance of the attention, motivation, and knowledge challenges. Therefore, institutional 
entrepreneurs in more opaque fields have to design and apply clear rules, strong incentives, 
and capacity building to ensure adopter compliance. 
Setting rules. The causal complexity that reigns in relatively opaque fields is exemplified by 
socio-environmental governance. Social issues cover a diversity of aspects, ranging from 
ethnicity, social class, workplace democracy, and age to wages, working hours, safety, and 
work load (Carroll, 2008). Environmental issues encompass aspects as wide-ranging as (non-
renewable and renewable) natural resource stocks, toxicity, biodiversity, desertification, and 
climate change (Rockström et al., 2009). The sheer number and multifaceted nature of these 
issues render a full understanding challenging for sustainability experts (Atkinson, Dietz, & 
Neumayer, 2007), leave alone for firms whose business is to do business. Cognitively 
bounded companies are more than likely not to be fully aware of, and thus not to pay due 
attention to, many of these socio-environmental issues (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), unless 
they are induced to consider them. Institutions such as performance-based sustainability 
standards that identify and specify relevant socio-environmental aspects will thus stimulate 
adopters to duly consider these issues.  
Practice multiplicity and vague, elusive wording such as ‘promoting social equity and 
environmental protection’ fail to provide direction. They lead to ambiguity and ignorance 
among adopters, who may not pay due attention to relevant aspects or who may opt for 
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inappropriate practices (Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012). Therefore, the more explicit and 
detailed sustainability standards formulate the socio-environmental rules to be met, the more 
likely adopters are to follow those rules. Detailed codification offers clear guidance and limits 
the room for divergent interpretation, thereby reducing ambiguity and uncertainty (Terlaak, 
2007). For example, socially relevant rules specified by Fairtrade International (2013a) for 
hired labor include “training opportunities, non discriminatory employment practices, no child 
labour, no forced labour, access to collective bargaining processes and freedom of association 
of the workforce, condition of employment exceeding legal minimum requirements, adequate 
occupational safety and health conditions and sufficient facilities for the workforce to manage 
the Fairtrade Premium.” Adopters of Fairtrade standards are thus sensitized towards offering 
training, promoting equal opportunities, banning child labor, avoiding forced labor, 
negotiating with worker representatives, etc. In sum, the concrete and unambiguous 
specification of universal (socio-environmental) rules remedies the attention problem and 
fosters (standard) compliance. 
Devising incentives. The behavioral invisibility of opportunistic adopters undermines the 
effectiveness of institutions such as sustainability standards.  Firms have a ‘natural interest’ to 
exploit human and natural resources (through low wages, pollution, etc.), because such 
practices may raise their (short-run) profits and are not (fully) observable to external 
stakeholders (King & Toffel, 2009), especially when goods are produced in remote locations 
and are traded internationally through multiple actors (Levy, 2008). To overcome this 
motivation barrier, institutions such as sustainability standards signal that labeled products 
and firms are a separate category (Navis & Glynn, 2010), associated with ‘responsible 
practices’ (King et al., 2005), such as paying ‘fair prices’ to smallholders and avoiding the use 
of pesticides. Standards turn disincentives into incentives, because they offer adopters 
material benefits such as price premiums and selective supply chains (Henson et al., 2011; 
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King et al., 2012), legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Sine et 
al., 2007), and the possibility to live up to their norms of ‘responsible corporate citizens’ 
(Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Reinecke et al., 2012). These benefits are 
confined to ‘club members’ (Potoski & Prakash, 2005) meeting the criteria specified by the 
adopted standards. For instance, African fishers who had adopted the GlobalGAP label 
enjoyed significantly higher export revenues than their uncertified counterparts (Henson et al., 
2011). 
The more attractive institutions such as sustainability standards are, however, the more 
they run the risk of symbolic adoption. Socially and environmentally poor performers, 
especially those adopting under external pressure, may wish to reap a standard’s benefits 
without bearing the associated costs (Sandholtz, 2012; King et al., 2012). In highly opaque 
fields, plagued by low behavioral visibility, such adopters may pretend to comply yet 
implement only symbolically to avoid the costs of ‘upgrading’ their socially and 
environmentally relevant behavior (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010; Christmann & Taylor, 
2006). Therefore, compliance mechanisms such as stringent monitoring and social pressure 
need to be in place (Barrett, 2003; Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003), so that the rules established 
by institutional entrepreneurs are actually maintained (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). 
Indeed, credible enforcement is a prerequisite for successful self-regulation (King et al., 2012; 
Barnett & King, 2008). Independent, third-party monitoring is instrumental in enforcing 
compliance, even though auditing processes often show flaws such as lack of expertise, 
predictability of inspections, and conflicts of interests (Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Boiral, 
2012). Institutions such as sustainability standards that manage to overcome these auditing 
challenges are more likely to reveal non-compliance and can exert material sanctions, such as 
loss of the right to carry a sustainability label, when defection is detected (King et al., 2012; 
Baron & Lyon, 2012). For instance, the Fair Labor Association is more likely to unveil lack of 
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compliance because it practices unexpected field visits by external auditors (including local 
NGOs) to relatively large, high-risk apparel and footwear producers certified (O’Rourke, 
2007). To recap, the existence of strong incentives (i.e., significant material, relational, and/or 
normative benefits of joining institutions in conjunction with the active enforcement of these 
institutions) addresses the motivation problem and leads adopters in highly opaque fields to 
substantively comply with the rules specified by their initiators. 
Building capacity. A third challenge to ensuring substantive compliance in more opaque 
fields is the lack of relevant knowledge. The causal complexity and practice multiplicity of, 
for instance, socio-environmental governance may be such that corporate adopters simply 
ignore how to comply with the rules set by the initiators of sustainability standards. Especially 
small firms in developing countries, such as smallholders, may not have the technical and 
organizational capabilities to produce and trade in socially and environmentally ‘responsible’ 
ways (Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 2008). Institutions that offer implementation options are, 
therefore, instrumental in clearing this compliance barrier. Many process-oriented 
sustainability standards offer adopters the possibility to ‘build capacity’ by transferring 
knowledge of ‘best practices’ (Perez-Aleman, 2011). For instance, the UTZ Certified standard 
offers technical advice to farmers to increase their productivity and upgrade the quality of 
their coffee beans (UTZ Certified, 2013; Bitzer et al., 2008).  
Sustainability standards and other institutions in highly opaque fields that extensively 
transfer universal ‘best practices’ are more likely to elicit adopter compliance than those 
leaving the implementation mode up to the discretion of adopters (Terlaak, 2007). First, 
rolling out ‘best practices’ universally facilitates monitoring. Second, the practices advocated 
by standard developers are aligned with the rules of their institutions. Relatedly, standardized 
capacity building reduces practice multiplicity and induces adopters to think and act along the 
lines proposed by institutional entrepreneurs. Especially when combined with specific rules 
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and strong incentives, capacity building promotes substantive compliance with institutional 
requirements. For instance, Fairtrade International accredits only smallholders who have 
organized themselves through cooperatives to boost their bargaining power (Reinecke et al., 
2012). Capacity building through the transfer of ‘best practices’ thus mitigates the knowledge 
problem and leads to compliant adopter behavior. Figure 1 shows that the causal complexity, 
practice multiplicity, and behavioral invisibility that drive field opacity create the need for 
devising and implementing concrete and uniform rules, strong incentives, and standardized 
capacity building to ensure adopter compliance. The ideas outlined above can be formalized 
as follows: 
Proposition 1: The higher the degree of field opacity, the less likely that institutions without 
concrete and uniform rules, strong incentives, and active transfer of ‘best practices’ will elicit 
substantive adopter compliance.   
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
THE COMPLIANCE-ACHIEVEMENT TRADE-OFF 
Rationale for the Trade-off 
The importance that institutional entrepreneurs attribute to substantive compliance is driven 
by the idea that compliant adopters contribute to the achievement of an institution’s (socio-
environmental) goals. Building on recent work by Bromley and Powell (2012), I now argue 
that this idea may be mistaken because substantive compliance may not lead to the 
accomplishment of the envisaged goals and may even be counterproductive in highly opaque 
fields. Bromley and Powell distinguish between ‘policy-practice decoupling’ (i.e., the 
classical form of decoupling, where adopters do not substantively implement their formally 
embraced policies) and ‘means-ends decoupling’ (i.e., complying with formal policies but not 
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achieving their intended goals). They argue that the latter type of decoupling has been 
neglected despite its importance, especially in areas where an obscure relation exists between 
means and ends. I concur with this view and further develop it by advancing the idea that a 
trade-off exists when remedying both types of decoupling in highly opaque fields.
7
 The main 
reasons are that causal complexity and practice multiplicity undermine the ability of 
compliance-oriented institutions to achieve the envisaged goals and that a strong compliance 
orientation constrains the agency of adopters. 
Causal complexity. As argued above, relatively opaque fields are typically complex in 
nature: they drive and are driven by a multitude of actors and factors. Socio-environmental 
governance exemplifies this complexity, because focal issues are ‘caught in causal webs’, 
implying that they cannot be fully understood without simultaneously considering the 
numerous and heterogeneous actors and factors to which they are directly and indirectly 
related, often in non-linear ways (Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012; Atkinson et al., 2007; Carson, 
1962). For instance, poverty is a ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that has 
numerous, interrelated causes and consequences, not only economic but also social, political, 
and historical ones, and poor people can be caught in poverty traps due to the concurrence of 
multiple forces (Easterly, 2006; Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). The same counts for environmental 
problems such as climate change, soil degradation, and biodiversity reduction (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment Board, 2005; Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2005). One 
implication is the systemic nature of more opaque fields: multiple factors need to be 
considered in conjunction to adequately understand and govern focal (socio-environmental) 
issues (Young, 2012; Bitzer et al., 2008; Adger, 2007). Focusing only on direct, bilateral 
                                                          
7
 To be sure, I do not argue that there is a trade-off between both types of decoupling as such, but I do contend 
that an inverse relation exists between remedying policy-practice decoupling and remedying means-ends 
decoupling. 
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relations would thus lead to an incomplete, or even wrong, understanding and regulation of 
the issues at hand.  
Causal complexity raises the need for clarity, which compliance-oriented institutions 
offer. However, the nature of such institutions hampers adopters to effectively respond to 
focal issues. Concrete and uniform rules stimulate compliance, because they stipulate desired 
behavior and facilitate monitoring (Bromley & Powell, 2012), thereby reducing adopter 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Terlaak, 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Institutions such as 
sustainability standards that are conducive to compliance prescribe and incentivize adhering 
to clear rules. However, the narrow focus on such rules easily distracts attention from the 
wider context in which focal (socio-environmental) issues are embedded and may have a 
‘waterbed effect’: the solution of one problem but the creation of another (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010; Dasgupta, 2000; Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). For instance, many 
sustainability standards categorically ban child labor. This looks like a reasonable means to 
avoid the exploitation of a vulnerable group. However, this ban can have unintended side-
effects, such as (further) impoverishment (Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007). As Fairtrade 
critics indicate: “Many small farmers mentioned that child labour prohibition enforcement 
carried a risk of reducing the families’ income and consequently the chances of the families’ 
children of going to school.” (FAIR, 2012: 16). Another illustration is the prescription of 
cooperatives as a means of workplace democracy and egalitarian income distribution. “[B]y 
insisting that small farmers join cooperatives, FAIRTRADE inadvertently aggravates existing 
problems of exploitation and abuse by traditional cocoa bosses…” (FAIR, 2012: 11). These 
outcomes are clearly at odds with Fairtrade’s mission to “connect disadvantaged producers 
and consumers, promote fairer trading conditions and empower producers to combat poverty, 
strengthen their position and take more control over their lives” (Fairtrade International, 
2013b). Both examples illustrate that categorical bans on child labor and other organizational 
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forms than cooperatives are well-intended rules that may address only a part of the bigger 
problem and that may lead to ill-understood cause-consequence relations, thereby shifting or 
aggravating the very (socio-environmental) problems that institutions such as sustainability 
standards are meant to solve or alleviate. 
Practice multiplicity. As explained earlier, practice multiplicity renders a full understanding 
and comparison of the merits and limitations of divergent practices more challenging. 
However, it is important to realize that practices may be divergent because the contexts in 
which they are embedded are dissimilar. Practices need to match the “requisite variety” 
(Ashby, 1956) of the (heterogeneous) contexts in which they are embedded. In other words, 
the effectiveness of practices is context-contingent (Donaldson, 2001). Socio-environmental 
governance is a case in point, because socio-environmental issues are statically and 
dynamically context-dependent, calling for tailored solutions (McElroy & Van Engelen, 
2012). Causes of and solutions to social and environmental problems vary per geographic 
region, cultural setting, socio-political system, and economic situation (Ostrom, 2012; Adger, 
2007). This is related to local differences in soil structure, atmospheric conditions, actor 
preferences, social relations, and economic development. Irrigation needs and possibilities are 
different in subtropical areas than in arid regions with poor soil quality (Von Weizsäcker et 
al., 2009). Certain producers and workers may prefer to accumulate material wealth, whereas 
others may prioritize a safe and democratic work environment. Large power differences are 
common and productive in certain cultures but not in others (Hofstede, 2001). And demand 
and supply characteristics are different in subsistence economies, where producers seek to be 
self-sufficient with modest resources, than in emerging markets, where firms are more 
munificent and globally oriented (Perez-Aleman, 2011; Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 2008). 
Furthermore, biophysical and social systems may evolve, implying that today’s (local) 
solutions to (context-specific) problems may be outdated tomorrow, calling for the 
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development of “adaptive capacity” (Young, 2012: 87). According to Dietz et al. (2003: 
1909), “[f]ixed rules are likely to fail because they place too much confidence in the current 
state of knowledge, whereas systems that guard against the low probability, high consequence 
possibilities and allow for change may be suboptimal in the short run but prove wiser in the 
long run.” For instance, standards with fixed quotas for fish stocks may be counterproductive 
because fish populations frequently migrate.  
Many institutions such as sustainability standards promote substantive compliance 
through uniform rules, incentives, and practices to reduce ambiguity among adopters and to 
block escape routes that (prospective) low performers may envision by proposing deviant 
practices (Gilbert et al., 2011). However, such uniform institutions are at odds with the (static 
and dynamic) context contingency of the focal (socio-environmental) issues (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). An illustration is Fairtrade’s categorical ban on child labor, referred to above, 
which may only be feasible for producers with medium incomes, who can ‘afford’ to exempt 
their children from working (Khan et al., 2007). Also, it should be observed that the 
involvement of children in economic activities may be regarded differently in (certain) 
African cultures than in Western countries. According to a Cameroonian farmer, “[child 
labor] is considered as part of the household chores children do to help their parents. I do not 
consider this child abuse” (FAIR, 2012: 16). As these examples show, compliance-oriented 
institutions such as sustainability standards which apply universal rules, incentives, and 
practices, irrespective of the specific geographic, cultural, socio-political, and economic 
conditions that adopters face, will easily fail to achieve their envisaged objectives. 
Constrained agency. Causal complexity and context contingency both call for flexible 
solutions to achieve the envisaged goals. While the existence of numerous, interrelated ties 
among and between actors and factors hampers a comprehensive understanding and 
assessment of complex systems, the upside is that these multiple connections offer the 
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opportunity to design and implement multiple solutions. In other words, different means can 
be used to achieve the same ends. Applying this principle of equifinality (Meyer, Tsui, & 
Hinings, 1993; Fiss, 2011) to the field of socio-environmental governance implies that firms 
can use different combinations of productive factors and methods to achieve corporate 
sustainability (Starik & Rands, 1995) or “resilient” socio-environmental systems (Adger, 
2007). Context contingency requires flexibility, because solutions need to be tailored to the 
variety of relevant contexts (Ashby, 1956). Different combinations of geographic, cultural, 
socio-political, and economic variables lead to a large number of possible contexts. The 
diversity of contexts which adopters face thus calls for the application of multiple solutions. 
As Gilbert et al. (2011: 38) argue: “What counts as appropriate behavior in the light of 
universal standards can differ from context to context.”   
The problem with many compliance-oriented institutions such as sustainability 
standards is their heavy bias towards exploitation: they circumscribe, incentivize, and monitor 
rules and practices in very specific and unambiguous ways, leaving little room for 
interpretation (Gilbert et al., 2011; Terlaak, 2007). Exploitation crowds out exploration 
(Benner & Tushman, 2002), so these ‘iron-cast’ rules, incentives, and practices suffocate the 
creativity of adopters seeking to achieve an institution’s goals (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012). For 
instance, firms may come up with, but not be allowed to implement, creative solutions 
unimagined by institutional entrepreneurs that would achieve the goals of institutions such as 
sustainability standards better than the ‘best practices’ prescribed by their initiators (Terlaak, 
2007; cf. Ostrom, 2012 and Colvin & Boswell, 2007). Likewise, adopters with an intimate 
understanding of feasible solutions tailored to local (socio-environmental) challenges may be 
kept from implementing them when standardized solutions are imposed (Perez-Aleman & 
Sandilands, 2008). Compliance-oriented institutions in highly opaque fields that apply 
uniform rules, incentives, and practices may thus “hit the target and miss the point” (Frey et 
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al., 2013: 957). These institutions may thwart the achievement of the intended goals because 
they do not stimulate, or even forbid, creative adopter solutions contributing to goal 
achievement. The arguments developed in this section can be recapped as follows: 
Proposition 2: The higher the degree of field opacity, the less likely that the adoption of 
institutions which are highly compliance-oriented leads to the achievement of the goals 
formulated by their initiators. 
 
Reducing the Trade-off 
The discussion above has demonstrated that institutional entrepreneurs in more opaque fields 
face a real dilemma. If they are to avoid purely symbolic adoption by opportunistic firms 
wishing to reap the benefits without bearing the costs or by well-intended adopters ignoring 
how to comply, these institutions must have specific and uniform adoption requirements: a 
clear reward structure, the strict enforcement of measurable rules, and the transfer of universal 
‘best practices’. Institutions designed and implemented in this way offer the direction, 
motivation, and support to warrant compliant behavior by their adopters. While compliance-
oriented institutions reduce some field opacity, especially by making adopter behavior more 
visible, their rigidity easily leads to overshooting the envisaged marks due to the causal 
complexity and context contingency of focal issues as well as the discouragement of creative 
solutions by adopters. Goal achievement in highly opaque fields calls for flexibility in the 
application of a standard’s rules, incentives, and practice transfer, since complex problems 
call for a more integrative judgment of relevant criteria while divergent contexts require the 
application of tailored and evolving solutions. Institutional entrepreneurs in relatively opaque 
fields thus face a trade-off: privileging rigidity to ensure substantive compliance may 
compromise the achievement of the intended goals, while favoring flexibility to warrant goal 
attainment may enhance the risk of symbolic adoption. In other words, institutions in more 
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opaque fields are threatened by two types of decoupling (policy-practice and means-ends) and 
remedying one kind of decoupling may undermine the ability to address the other one. How 
can this trade-off between compliance and achievement be solved, or at least reduced? The 
antipodal nature of the breeding grounds of compliance and achievement leads to the 
impossibility to design and uphold optimal institutions in highly opaque fields. However, the 
trade-off can be reduced by designing key rules with a systemic mindset, encouraging 
adopters to internalize an institution’s goals, and developing ‘niche institutions’ to 
accommodate context specificity.  
Fostering a systemic mindset. Institutional entrepreneurs can reduce the causal-complexity-
driven trade-off between compliance and achievement by prescribing and incentivizing only 
rules and practices that do not have side-effects which significantly undermine a standard’s 
own goals. While the focus on specific, highly visible or otherwise salient issues is 
understandable against the backdrop of pleasing constituencies (Kerr, 1975), a systemic 
mindset is instrumental in coming to grips with the lateral and multi-level complexity that 
reigns in relatively opaque fields such as socio-environmental governance (Levy & 
Lichtenstein, 2012; Starik & Rands, 1995; Van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003). A systemic 
mindset is an attitude of comprehensively considering how specific actions affect other actors 
and factors that are interrelated across space and/or time (Espinosa & Walker, 2011; Sterman, 
2000). Holistic thinking (i.e., considering aggregate, direct and indirect implications of 
specific actions) and reflexivity (i.e., anticipating expected outcomes of envisaged actions) are 
key principles of a systemic mindset that preclude, or at least limit, undesired outcomes that 
result from partial solutions (Young, 2012; Meadows et al., 2005; Bitzer et al., 2008). 
Holistic thinking can be practiced by charting interconnections among and between 
actors and factors around a particular (socio-environmental) issue in a specific setting (such as 
a geographic region) and running simulations or crafting scenarios that capture the direct and 
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indirect effects of envisaged rules, incentives, and practices (Young, 2012). These techniques 
enable a systematic comparison of different policy options, including an assessment of their 
opportunity costs (i.e., the foregone benefits for policy adopters). They might reveal, for 
example, that a sustainability standard that limits working hours and tasks to be carried out by 
children in combination with the employer’s obligation to offer a minimum amount and 
quality of schooling is a better solution in a region struck by abject poverty than a categorical 
ban of child labor. These tools might also demonstrate that certification and monitoring costs 
should be deliberately kept at a minimum to avoid that standards inadvertently exclude small, 
resource-poor producers (Ponte, 2008).
8
 Running simulations and constructing scenarios also 
provide insights into distinguishing between minor (positive or negative) effects from 
intended policy measures and those which would lead to crossing thresholds and tipping 
actions towards highly favorable or undesired outcomes (Young, 2012). The compliance-
achievement trade-off that stems from causal complexity can thus be reduced when 
institutional entrepreneurs comprehensively chart the effects of intended policy measures and 
attune the latter to the overall impact of both direct and indirect consequences. 
Stimulating internalization. Entrepreneurs who stimulate adopters to internalize the goals of 
focal institutions can mitigate the tension that results from behavioral invisibility. As argued 
above, actors may adopt institutions for both external reasons (such as economic opportunities 
and societal legitimacy) and internal motives (in particular, normative conviction). Externally 
induced adopters, such as smallholders who have to adopt multiple sustainability standards to 
enter or pursue business transactions with different customers (Reinecke et al., 2012), are the 
ones most likely to either decouple policies and practices or to blindly follow the rules, 
because they consider institutions such as sustainability standards mere means to their own 
                                                          
8
 Recent advances in information technology enable stringent monitoring (e.g., through visual, ‘real-time’ 
control of standard adopters via satellites and webcams) at modest costs. 
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economic or relational ends (Sandholtz, 2012). The divergence between the objectives of a 
principal (here, the institutional entrepreneur) and those of an agent (i.e., the institutional 
adopter) drives undesired agent behavior (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007).  
This agency problem can be addressed by applying rigorous selection procedures for 
prospective adopters and by making socialization part and parcel of the ‘adoption package’ 
(Frey et al., 2013; Kerr, 1975). Carefully examining whether applicants endorse the 
institution’s goals, regularly training adopters about these goals, and encouraging adopters to 
share their experiences with other adopters are measures conducive to goal internalization 
(Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Nonaka, 1994). For instance, several sustainability standards use 
farmers clubs as effective tools for peer learning and social bonding.
9
 While it would be naïve 
to think that purely instrumental adopters will turn into intrinsic believers, socialization 
programs enhance the probability that adopters will progressively internalize the aims and act 
in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the focal institution (Kerr, 1975).
10
 Goal 
internalization has the additional advantage of enabling rule simplicity, because fewer and 
less specific rules are required to elicit adopter compliance.
11
 A related benefit is that adopters 
can be given more discretion to roll out innovative practices that are unforeseen by an 
                                                          
9
 Author communication with the global sustainable sourcing director of a large company co-developing and 
adopting multiple sustainability standards. 
10
 Bromley & Powell (2012) and Boxenbaum & Jonsson (2008) argue that symbolic adoption tends to evolve 
into substantive adoption, supporting the view that regular exposure to an institution’s goals progressively leads 
to goal internalization. For instance, Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008: 88) report that “[d]ecoupling also became 
infrequent when the ethics code was already integrated into daily activities through ethics code training 
programmes.” 
11
 Scholars have stressed the importance of designing simple rules to effectively operate in complex and dynamic 
contexts (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt & Bhatia, 2002; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).  
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institution but in line with its goals, thereby going beyond expectations (Sandholtz, 2012; 
Colvin & Boswell, 2007). Institutional entrepreneurs who encourage adopters to internalize an 
institution’s goals can thus mitigate the trade-off resulting from behavioral invisibility by 
externally motivated adopters.  
Creating niche institutions. Entrepreneurs can better manage the tension that results from 
context-diversity-driven practice multiplicity by having a ‘master institution’ with certain 
‘hypernorms’ (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) or universal rules with core principles (such as a 
systematic management approach and warranting worker safety for sustainability standards) 
for all adopters, supplemented by (evolving) ‘niche institutions’ that are tailored to specific 
contextual variables such as geographic environments, social groups, and economic systems 
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
12
 Institutional entrepreneurs should both define 
‘untouchable’ principles that apply for all adopters and specify the conditions under which 
contexts are sufficiently different to develop new or adjust existing niche institutions (Young, 
2012). One example of large context variety is the case of small, data-deficient fisheries in 
developing countries, calling for a different niche sustainability standard than the large, data-
munificent cooperatives that the Marine Stewardship Council presently certifies (Ponte, 
2008). Some standards, such as GlobalGAP (‘good agricultural practices’), offer customized 
niche standards that reflect the divergent contexts in which adopters operate (GlobalGAP, 
2013).
13
 
                                                          
12
 This idea resonates with Donaldson & Dunfee’s (1994) combination of ‘macrosocial contracts’ with basic 
norms for all and ‘microsocial contracts’ that are adapted to relevant contexts. 
13
 In a related vein, the True Sustainability Index (Center for Sustainable Organizations, 2013) exemplifies the 
idea of evaluating corporate socio-environmental performance against the backdrop of the (social and 
biophysical) contexts in which firms operate. 
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Niche institutions cover middle ground between individualized agreements and 
universal institutions, diverse enough to differentiate between heterogeneous contexts but 
convergent enough to cover settings with considerable common ground (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010). They strike a balance between adaptation requirements (to accommodate 
context idiosyncracies) and uniformity imperatives (to offer clarity to adopters and 
manageability to institutional entrepreneurs). Niche institutions may emerge from 
participatory approaches (Dasgupta, 2000) and field experiments that lead to the discovery of 
locally feasible solutions. For instance, Conservation International and Starbuck’s CAFE 
sustainability standard was based on field experiments in targeted developing countries, 
which led to the discovery of locally fruitful agricultural practices – a result which a standard 
“imposed from the top, or that focuses on immediate outcomes based on advanced country 
conditions” would not have generated (Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 2008: 40). Institutional 
entrepreneurs who combine master and niche institutions can thus mitigate the trade-off that 
ensues from practice multiplicity in response to context diversity. The three options to reduce 
the compliance-achievement trade-off discussed in this section can be restated as follows:  
Proposition 3: In relatively opaque fields, institutions which encourage their adopters to 
develop a systemic mindset and internalize goals and which contain niche institutions reduce 
the existing trade-off between enforcing compliance and achieving goals.   
 
TOWARDS A CLOSER UNDERSTANDING OF MEANS-ENDS RELATIONS 
Discussion 
The number of institutions seeking to regulate relatively opaque fields has mushroomed over 
the past few decades to reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity inhering in such fields (Bromley 
& Powell, 2012). This paper has sought to tease out the conditions under which the adoption 
of institutions in more opaque fields leads to the achievement of the envisaged goals. 
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Voluntary sustainability standards, addressing specific socio-environmental issues, exemplify 
such institutions. Previous institutional work on sustainability standards has identified a 
number of contingencies that account for the failure or imperfect achievement of standards’ 
goals, including the lack of specific rules (Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012) and the deficiency 
of standard enforcement mechanisms (King et al., 2012). As a result, adopters have the 
opportunity to decouple official policies from actual practices (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009; 
Sandholtz, 2012) and merely engage in symbolic adoption (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010; 
Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Zajac & Westphal, 1995), thereby paying only lip service or 
confining their efforts to highly visible yet materially insignificant actions (Kerr, 1975).  
These ‘policy-practice decoupling’ arguments are, indeed, important accounts of why 
many institutions in highly opaque fields do not, or only partially, lead to the results intended 
by their initiators. However, the extant literature has largely ignored another, potentially more 
significant, account. Building on recent work by Bromley and Powell (2012), who propose 
‘means-ends decoupling’ as an alternative explanation of why policy adopters in more opaque 
fields fail to achieve the envisaged goals, I have argued that causal complexity and practice 
multiplicity obscure the impact of an institution’s design and implementation parameters. In 
such settings, institutional theory would benefit from ‘importing’ insights offered by 
complexity theory (Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012; Young, 2012) to acknowledge systemic, often 
non-linear interrelations among and between relevant actors and factors at different levels. 
These insights enable the development of viable institutions, whose in-built adaptive capacity 
to co-evolve with their contexts renders such institutions more responsive and robust 
(Espinosa & Walker, 2011). Otherwise, institutions seeking to fix the policy-practice 
compliance gap by formulating specific and uniform rules, devising strong incentives, and 
transferring universal ‘best practices’ may create or widen the ‘means-ends gap’. Compliance-
oriented institutions not only fail to sufficiently account for causal complexity and practice 
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multiplicity but also smother innovative practices by adopters. Therefore, the harder 
institutional entrepreneurs such as standard setters try to make adopters comply with their 
requirements, the more their institutions may fail to achieve the envisaged goals. In other 
words, a trade-off exists between the rigidity required to enforce compliance and the 
flexibility needed to achieve goals. Options to mitigate this trade-off include adopting a 
systemic mindset when devising institutions, stimulating adopters to internalize a standard’s 
goals, and supplementing universal core principles and arrangements with dedicated niche 
institutions. 
A limitation of the paper is its confinement to fields that are relatively opaque. The 
trade-off between compliance and achievement is less likely to occur in more transparent 
fields, where relevant interrelations are easier to identify and measure, thus hardly facing 
problems of causal complexity, practice multiplicity, and behavioral invisibility. Field 
transparency reduces the need for institutional entrepreneurs to specify rules, incentives, and 
practices, while substantive compliance and goal achievement can be better aligned. For 
instance, athletic competition is a relatively transparent field, in which limited rules suffice 
and stringent anti-doping tests need not undermine the achievement of the ‘fair play’ goal. 
Another limitation is the paper’s focus on one specific dimension of the adoption of 
institutions. Other relevant factors that account for the conditions and extent of goal 
achievement were not, or only marginally, considered, including: the number of adopters 
(Schuler & Christmann, 2011); the diffusion process (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lawrence, Winn, & 
Jennings, 2001; Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury , 2009); the stage of adoption (Kennedy & Fiss, 
2009; Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010); the degree of interest alignment within adopting firms 
(Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Pache & Santos, 2010; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007); the extent 
of information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders (Crilly et al., 2012); the 
nature of (global) supply chains (Levy, 2008; O’Rourke, 2007); the role of reinforcing 
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institutions such as legislation (Gulbrandsen, 2010; Lee, 2009; Vogel, 2008; Amengual, 2010; 
Kim, 2013); the influence of competing or complementary standards (Reinecke et al., 2012); 
the role of the media and confrontational NGOs (Yaziji & Doh, 2009); and the involvement of 
consumers (Schuler & Christmann, 2011). While recognizing the importance of these factors, 
the paper was deliberately focused to highlight the role of one major, understudied dimension 
of adoption that significantly impairs the performance of institutions in relatively opaque 
fields.  
Contributions 
Early institutional work (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) has shown that organizational adopters of 
institutions often do not achieve the goals envisaged by their developers. Especially when 
adoption is induced under external pressure, organizations may decouple their practices from 
their policies, in which case they “symbolically endorse practices prescribed by one logic 
while actually implementing practices promoted by another logic” (Pache & Santos, 2013: 
974). This symbolic support typically consists of formally adopting the same practices as 
similar organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). I have argued that adopters may not 
achieve the intended goals for a very different reason. In essence, adopters may not attain 
their goals despite substantive compliance.  I have built on Bromley and Powell’s (2012) idea 
that substantively adopted practices may not be effective means to achieve the envisaged 
goals, especially when the relation between both is more opaque. The present paper goes 
beyond their insights by developing the novel argument of a negative relationship, rather than 
the absence of a connection: a trade-off exists when addressing both types of decoupling in 
highly opaque fields. While opacity enhances the need for developing and maintaining 
‘strong’ (i.e., compliance-oriented) institutions, the latter are ill-equipped to cope with the 
challenges encountered in more opaque fields. The current paper has conceptualized why and 
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how remedying policy-practice decoupling often leads to the creation or exacerbation of 
means-ends decoupling, and vice versa.  
While applying my arguments to the field of socio-environmental governance, these 
relations are also likely to hold in other highly opaque institutional fields, where goal 
achievement is hard to measure and to causally relate to means deployed and where context 
variety calls for divergent practices. Other relatively opaque fields include health care (Nigam 
& Ocasio, 2010), management consultancy (David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013), global 
geopolitics (Levy, 2008), climate change mitigation (Ansari, Wijen, & Gray, 2013), financial 
stability (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2010), traffic security (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), public 
service (Frey et al., 2013), and academia. In these fields, the concrete, uniform rules (standard 
operating procedures, blueprints, examinations, etc.), strong incentives (such as financial 
benefits, legitimacy, and fines), and ‘best practice’ dissemination (through formal training, 
internet sites, conferences, etc.) are widely used to induce field participants to comply 
substantively, even though the rigorous implementation of such behavior-homogenizing 
institutions, often at a global scale (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997), may not lead to 
the achievement of the intended goals. For example, are accredited universities the ones 
offering superior teaching and research or do they know better how to please accreditation 
bodies (Trank & Washington, 2009; Bromley & Powell, 2012)? Are students scoring high 
grades for exams brighter than their counterparts with more modest grades or are they the 
ones who best know how to ‘play the examination game’ without necessarily being better 
prepared for their professional futures (Boiral, 2012; Kerr, 1975)? And do frequently cited 
articles published in top-ranked academic journals reveal more rigorous and relevant research 
(Baum, 2011; Starbuck, 2005; Gans & Shepherd, 1994)? Since the paper’s insights apply to a 
variety of relatively opaque institutional fields, a first contribution is to the institutional 
literature by identifying and explaining the tension between compliance with an institution’s 
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rules (‘the letter’) and achievement of the goals for which those rules were defined (‘the 
spirit’) as well as offering partial remedies. The present paper has established a conceptual 
framework for studying the importance of this trade-off in a variety of institutional fields that 
are characterized by high opacity. Empirical work could establish the extent to which and the 
(additional) conditions under which the theorized trade-off exists in different opaque fields.
14
 
Much research into sustainability standards has focused on ways to deter opportunistic 
adoption by legitimacy or market seekers (e.g., King et al., 2012; Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 
2010; Christmann & Taylor, 2006), advocating stringent, selective standards that may solve 
the compliance problem but inadvertently overshoot the standard’s marks. The present paper 
recognizes both problems and argues that the latter problem needs more attention to 
adequately address socio-environmental challenges. The ideas presented resonate with earlier 
calls to balance rigidity and flexibility in (sustainability) standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010; Gilbert et al., 2011) and extend insights into socio-environmental governance by 
articulating the reasons why and ways in which such a (delicate) balance can be achieved. 
Therefore, a second contribution is to the socio-environmental governance literature by 
specifying conditions under which sustainability standards are more likely to reasonably 
achieve their goals. Future studies could test whether the ideas presented hold for different 
socio-environmental institutions. 
Inspired by the maxim ‘nothing as practical as a good theory’ and responding to recent 
calls for more practically relevant theory around important contemporary societal topics 
                                                          
14
 Field studies could draw on: system dynamic modeling (Sterman, 2000; Repenning, 2002) to capture direct 
and indirect, linear and non-linear relations; game scenarios to chart the effect of incentive structures and other 
actors (Boschetti, 2011; Barrett, 2003); configurational approaches to account for factor combinations and 
context dependence (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 1987); and qualitative approaches to provide in-depth insights into the 
motivation and behavior of heterogeneous actors (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009). 
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(Suddaby, 2012; Corley & Gioia, 2011), I have sought to advance conceptual ideas that can 
benefit practitioners by deconstructing why institutional entrepreneurs in relatively opaque 
fields face inherent tensions when trying to achieve both adopter compliance and goal 
achievement and by indicating how entrepreneurs can reduce some of these tensions. I applied 
these conceptual insights to one practically relevant field, socio-environmental governance, 
although the insights can be applied to a variety of institutional fields struck by high opacity. 
While the upsurge of corporate compliance officers (O’Rourke, 2007) over the past decade is 
a logical corporate response to societal pressure to address socio-environmental 
underperformance (Gilbert et al., 2011), this paper has shown that such compliance efforts 
often fail to bear their fruits, especially when ignoring the complexity and specificities of 
socio-environmental issues and enforcing docile adopter behavior. A third contribution is thus 
to practitioners by presenting a conceptual diagnosis of a major practical problem. The real-
life examples and concrete guidance offered (such as simulating to practice systemic thinking, 
setting up adopter clubs to encourage internalization, and developing niche institutions to 
reflect variety) can be useful for policy-makers in firms, NGOs, and governmental bodies who 
need to conceive and implement effective and manageable solutions in relatively opaque 
fields. 
Conclusion 
While it is a truism to say that complex, wicked problems do not have easy solutions, it is 
remarkable that scholars and practitioners have paid so little attention to the means-ends gap, 
which arguably undermines the performance of institutions in highly opaque fields. In 
particular, the focus on eliciting substantive compliance has distracted our attention from 
ensuring that the envisaged goals be achieved. Enforcing compliance can even undermine 
goal achievement. Institutional entrepreneurs seeking to govern more opaque fields thus face 
a real dilemma. Opacity creates a need for concrete and uniform rules, strong incentives, and 
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‘best practice’ dissemination to ensure substantive compliance by adopters, but the rigidity of 
compliance-oriented institutions inadvertently erodes their capacity to address the complexity 
and diversity challenges inhering in such fields. By contrast, institutions privileging outcomes 
may suffer from mere symbolic adoption by cognitively bounded and extrinsically motivated 
adopters.  
In conclusion, there are no conditions under which the adoption of institutions in highly 
opaque fields can lead to the full achievement of the intended goals because of an inherent 
trade-off between remedying ‘policy-practice decoupling’ and addressing ‘means-ends 
decoupling,’ although institutional entrepreneurs can reduce this compliance-achievement 
trade-off. Systemically designed institutions that promote goal internalization and duly 
consider context contingencies offer the potential to strike a balance between rigidity and 
flexibility, thereby laying a solid foundation for the adoption of institutions that are 
reasonably impactful in terms of achieving the goals envisaged by the entrepreneurs 
championing them. The institution of sustainability standards in the field of socio-
environmental governance has illustrated the arguments developed, although the paper’s 
conceptual insights are likely to hold in a variety of other highly opaque fields. In this respect, 
academics can seize two opportunities. The first concerns self-reflection on the assessment 
and regulation of teaching and research performance. The second consists of conducting 
further (empirical) research on the nexus between substantive compliance and goal 
achievement, whose outcomes enable other practitioners in relatively opaque fields to develop 
practices that are reasonably effective in addressing both types of challenges. The desire to 
warrant substantive compliance amidst opacity has led many institutional entrepreneurs to 
increasingly invert Machiavelli’s adage that the ends justify the means. Time for a balanced 
reorientation. 
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